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NEGLIGENCE - LIABILITY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE - Defendant
negligently sold unlabeled poisoned bran, thereby causing the death of or permanent injury to the buyer's cows, and the loss of his dairy business. As a result of
this calamity, the buyer died from a decompensated heart caused by emotional
distress and nervous shock. The buyer had. commenced action for damages
and it is continued here by his wife as administratrix of his estate. Held, recovery may be had for the buyer's death. Rasmussen v. Benson, (Neb. 1938) 280
N. W. 890.
Paramount in every negligence action is the question of duty. Many courts
have failed to distinguish sharply between the concept of duty and that of
proximate cause,1 thereby causing much confusion in the cases. No one decision has done more to clarify the duty concept, than the opinion of Justice
Cardozo in the Palsgraf case. 2 Following closely Justice Cardozo's reasoning,
Justice Wickhem in W aube v. Warrington 3 recognized that the decision in
fright cases should not turn on proximate cause but rather on duty; 4 that is,
the plaintiff must show that he belonged to the class of persons who were
threatened or exposed to harm by the unreasonable risk for which the defend-

Campbell, "Duty, Fault, and Legal Cause," 1938 Wis. L. REv. 402 at 408.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
8 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497 (1935). For contrast,
the reasoning in this case should be compared with the similar case, Hambrook v.
Stokes Bros., [1925] l K. B. 141, in which recovery was allowed on the basis of proximate cause. See also, Spearman v. ':vicCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912).
4 "The problem must be approached at the outset from the view-point of the duty
of defendant and the right of plaintiff, and not from the view-point of proximate
cause. • •• It is not enough to find a breach of duty to the child, follow the ccmsequences of such breach as far as the law of proximate cause will permit them to go,
and then sustain a recovery for the mother if a physical injury to her by reason of
shock or fright is held not too remote." Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 at 605,
258 N. W. 497 (1935). "But where death results from fright alone the defendant
is not liable in damages, since such a result is so unusual and extraordinary that one ought
not to be held liable therefor." Lee v. City of Burlington, II3 Iowa 356 at 357, 85
N. W. 618 (1901).
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RECENT DECISIONS

ant was responsible. 5 Applying, then, this reasoning to the case at bar, It 1s
difficult to find any duty owing to the buyer by the defendant.6 Although there
is a divergence of opinion as to recovery for fright,7 the cases quite consistently
refuse to find a duty where the plaintiff is not put in physical peril by the defendant's act. 8 In the well-reasoned dissent of Justice Carter, concurred in
by Justice Eberly, the case at bar is distinguished from those cases 9 in which
the plaintiff, suffering from fright, is the person who was threatened with
physical danger. The conflict in these cases has not been over duty, but rather
as to matters of policy in determining the extent to which liability for negligence will be carried~10 By no interpretation of the facts in the principal case,
can it be said that the plaintiff was in danger of physical peril. It is submitted,
therefore, that the dissent, correctly holding no duty, eliminated any necessity
for a discussion of the other requisites of recovery, particularly proximate cause.
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5 HARPER, ToRTS, § 73 (1933): "There can not be, it is said, negligence 'in the
air,'" citing PoLLOCK, ToRTS, 13th ed. 468 (1929).
6 lnjury resulting from fear caused by the peril of another is not reasonably to
be anticipated; therefore, there is no liability for such injury. See notes 8 and IO infra.
7 Modem authority allows recovery for concurrent impact, however slight. Easton
v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 P. 597 (1916); Driscoll
v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N. E. 1010 (1910); Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y.
231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931). Some jurisdictions allow recovery without impact where
the fright is for the plaintiff's own safety. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn.
134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892); Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K. B. 669; 2 ToRTS
RESTATEMENT, § 436(2) (1934). In the minority are cases allowing recovery where
the fear is for the safety of another. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So.
927 (1912); Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] I K. B. 141; Bowman v. Williams,
164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). See cases cited in BoHLEN, CASES ON ToRTS, 3d
ed., 305, note 18 (1930).
8 Harper and McNeely, "Fright at Another's Peril; A Re-examination of the Basis
for Liability for Emotional Distress," 1938 Wis. L. REv. 426 at 427; II A. L. R.
1119 at 1143 (1921); 40 A. L. R. 983 at 986 (1926); 76 A. L. R. 681 at 686
(1932); 98 A. L. R. 402 at 405 (1935); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258
N. W. 497 (1935); Lee v. City of Burlington, ll3 Iowa 356, 85 N. W. 618 (1901);
Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 41 N. M. 318, 68 P. (2d) 168 (1937); Sanderson v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N. W. 542, 60 L. R. A. 403 (1902).
9 Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N. W. 335 (1931); Hanford v. Omaha
& C. B. Street Ry., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N. W. 643 (1925).
10 See generally, Bohlen, "Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence
Without Impact," 41 AM. L. REG. (N. S.) 141 at 144-145 (1902); Throckmorton,
"Damages for Fright," 34 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921); Goodrich, "Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage," 20 M1cH. L. REv. 497 at 507, note 45 (1922);
Harper and McNeely, "A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional
Distress," 193 8 Wis. L. REv. 426; Magruder, "Mental and Emotional Disturbance
in the Law of Torts," 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 at 1040 (1936).

